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Case No. 190:.>6 
I. STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Tnis is an original proceeding oetore the Supreme 
of Utan for the purpose of naving the lawfulness of an 
Jruer dated November 18, 1':182 and finalized on February 2, 1983 
er,, Industrial Commission of Utan in proceedings entitled 
·e' widow ot Alex Demetrios Georgas, Applicant, v. 
Kennecott Corporation, Defendant, File No. tuCJOl7S4, inyuirc 
into and determined as [:.>rovided by JS-1-tsJ, Utah Code ;,,,, 
1953, as amended. 
II. DISPOSITIUN BY THE INDUSTRIAL CUMMJ:OSJUN OF UTAH 
On November lts, l9t:>L, tne Industrial Commission ot 
Utah, through Administrative Law Judge Timothy C. Allen tr, 
Claim No. 8L0017S4, denied Kennecott's Motion to Dismiss ano 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in tavor 
of applicant Rose K. Georg as, widow of Alex Demetr ios Georgas, 
and against plaintiff Kennecott Corporation. Kennecott or. 
December 11, tiled with the Commission a Motion for Recon· 
sideration or Review requesting review and reconsideration b1 
tne Industrial Commission of tne Order awarding benefits ano 
reversal of the same. The Motion for Reconsideration anc 
Review was denied by Denial of Motion for Review entered by the 
Industrial Commission on February 2, 1983. Plaintiff thereupon 
filed this action with the Supreme Court of Utah on March 4, 
1983. 
III. RELIEF SOUGHT ON 
Plaintiff, Kennecott Corporation, upon this revie·, 
seeks to have the Order issued by the Industrial commission on 
November 18, and finalized on February 2, 1983, set as1ae 
in its entirety. 
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IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 fie essential facts pertinent to this controversy are 
and may be summarized as tollows: 
; ne deceased, Alex Demetr ios Georg as, on November 16, 
!%1 ana for many years prior tnereto, was employed as a 
tripper operator at plaintiff's Bingham Mine precipitation 
The record shows that nis Job was a "sit down" type JOb 
1nvolv1n':J a minimal amount ot pt;ysical exertion while operating 
Dy means of automatic controls a traveling tripper and certain 
conveyor belts. (R. Ex. D-1, R. 115, 121 and 122). On 
November lb, 1981 he reported to work at his usual time of 
J:UG P.M. ana worKed until his luncheon break at approximately 
6:JO P.M. (R. 131) . 
The recora shows without any controversy by either 
party that on the day in question the deceased up to and 
1ocluu1ng the last time he was seen at the lunchroom during tne 
lu;icheon break had made no complaints and had shown no physical 
or mea1cal problems ot any kind. (R. 86, 95, 105 and 131-32). 
l'ne record also shows that the deceased called his daughter at 
n0me near the end of his lunch period and that he seemed per-
fectly normal at that time. (R. 98 and 99). 
No one saw the deceasea leave tne lunchroom following 
t_r,e atJove-men ti oned telephone cal 1 but when he failed to return 
"' hico trlp;.>er operator work station at the end of the lunch 
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period a search was initiated. ( R. lJ2). 
nor had ne oeen seen at any ot the fJrec11.J1tator fJlant 
areas and it was not until apµrox1mately 11:1" P.M. that 
body was locatea tloat1ny face down and rest 1ny aya1nst ''·' 
retaining wall of the No. 
copper launder plant. 
9 settliny tank of 
(R. 140-4l) Tnis 
the unoccupied oJ; 
settliny tan •. 15 
located pernaps a quarter ot a mile away from any possible wore 
areas or travel routes of the deceased and is accessible or.I. 
by a narrow pathway containing numerous hazards and obstacles. 
(R. 126, l31J and 186, Ex. D-4, 5.) 
Ttie body of the deceased was removed from the tank anc 
taKen to the Stat.: Medical Examiner's off ice for an autops1 
which revealed that tne deceasea had "drownea in a copper pre-
cipitation tanK." ( R. 3 6) • Tt1e report further indicated tnat 
the deceased had arteriosclerot1c cardiovascular disease wh1c.o 
possibly contributed to his drowning. Plaintiff's medical wit· 
ness confirmea the existence of serious cardiovascular disease 
in decedent out did not rule out drowning as the ultimate cause 
of his death. 
The evidence was uncontroverted tnat there were no 
direct, indirect or even incidental duties related to the 
deceased's employment as a tripper operator which would reguJre 
or even explain his presence at the No. 9 settling tank where 
he was fauna. (R. 130). Tnis was specifically acknowledye•J 
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.,t · s (defendant herein) Memorandum in Support of Claim 
, and Burial Benefits (R. Ll0) as follows: 
It is unKnown why Mr. Georgas was at the 
where his death occurred. It is 
clear, however, that there was nothing 
directly connected with his occupational 
duties as a tripper operator which required 
his presence at the settling tank pond. 
Ana again in the same Memorandum (R. 212): 
The record here reflects that decedent was 
last seen alive by his co-workers during the 
lunch breaK. Tne record reflects that tne 
drinKing water supply in the operations 
center where tne workers ate their luncn was 
inoperative and that drinking water was 
availaole in the old operations center which 
sits JUSt to the west of the settling pond. 
It is notning more than speculation to say 
tnat the decedent went to the old operations 
center to get a dr inK and, in any event, 
that not explain why he went to tne 
No. 9 pond. (Empnasis supplied) 
Jn add1t1on, there was no evidence presented or even claimed to 
ina icate a possiole worK relat1onsnip oe-_ "'een decedent's 
cara1ovascular disease and his employment duties. Nevertne-
less, tne Administrative Law Judge found tnat decedent was in 
the cowrse of his employment at the time of hlS untimely deatn 
and tnat his death was "oy accident arising out of or in the 
course of nis employment" under the Utah Workmen's Compensation 
/\ct. He awarded deatn benefits to decedent's widow Rose K. 
Georgas, defendant herein, for the use and oenefit of nerself 
"'"' rier minor dependent cnildren. (R. 234-38). 
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On December 3, 1982, plaintiff f1l<>d Mut1un fr,r p, 
sideration or Review whicl1 was denucd L; ti"' Cu111 1 
Denial of Motion for Review dated Februdry "' 1983. i'L, 
thereupon filed this action on March 4, 1983 fur the pur,.,,, 
having the above-described Order inquired into and set aside. 
V. STATEMENT OF 
l. UtlDER UTAH WORKMEtl'S COMPENSATIOtl LAW, AS,, 
PRETED BY THIS COURT, THE CLAIMAW; MUST ESTABLISH A CACS 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEDENT'S EMPLOYMENT DUTIES AllD t: 
INJURY OR DEATH. 
2. THERE IS NO S UBST ANT I AL EVIDENCE Ill THE RECORJ 
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT DECEDENT'S DEATH AT THE tlO, 
SETTLING TANK WAS CAUSALLY RELATED TO HIS EMPLOYMENT 
3. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRE;: 
Ill ADOPTING THE ADMilHSTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S F ItlDING 
DECEDENT WAS •IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT• AT THE tin. 
SETTLING TANK WHERE HIS DEATH OCCURRED. 
VI. ARGUMEtlT 
l. UtlDER UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, AS 
PRETED BY THIS COURT, THE CLAIMANT MUST ESTABLISH A CAIJS' 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DECEDENT'S EMPLOYMENT DUTIES AND t.: 
INJURY OR DEATH. 
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Ann. 1953 sets fortr· '. 
statutory requirements for compensation in industrial 
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1-40. Evert employee mentioned in 
t 1ur1 h-1-43 who is inJured, and tne 
'""endents ot every such employee who is 
, , ilerJ, by accident arising out of or in the 
rourse of nis employment, wheresoever such 
1nJury occurred, provided tne same was not 
f'urposely self-inflicted, shall be entitled 
to receive, and snall be paid, such compen-
sation for loss sustainea on account of such 
inJury or deatt1, and sucn amount for 
medical, nurse and nospital services and 
meaicines, and, in case of deatn, such 
amount of funeral expenses, as is herein 
provided. 
It is establisned Utan law tnat tne mere occurrence of 
a:o inJury or deatn, by heart attack or otherwise, on the 
ilorr,1ses ot tne employer during worKing nours does not make 
socn inJury or death compensaole unaer this Section. In order 
:o t,e compensaole as an "accident arising out of or in the 
course ot employment" there must also be a causal relationship 
r,et1>een tne inJury or death and the employee's employment 
c ties. This was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as early 
os 11,b ir. M & K Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah <18b, 
P.2d 132 where tne following language is found: 
However even under the liberal provi-
sions ot our statute we have refused to open 
tne door to a recovery for all inJuries, 
without any causa 1 relationship between the 
empJ.oyment and tne acciaent merely because 
tne accident occurs on the premises of the 
employer during tne hours of employment . 
;,E also, Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction ana Mining Corp., 
_Jt P.2d 1144 (1977) where tn1s Court found compens-
·'"r in a heart attack case. The evidence there showed 
-7-
physical exertion greater than usual wr11le tJE't torminr3 as'cr" 
employment duties. This increased exertion was found tu 
placed added strain upon an already weakenerJ heart sut t 1c 1,, 
to constitute a material contributiny factor to the nearr 
attack which followea. Nevertheless, even tne maJority statE:. 
as follows: 
As a caveat against any misunderstanding ot 
the conclusion we reach nerein, we make the 
following observation: l'oe do not say that 
any time a person dies (or suffers inJury or 
disaoility) while on the JOO and performing 
his duties in tne usual way tnat that is 
necessarily a compensable accident. 565 
P.2d at ll4b. 
In Redman warehousing Corp. v. Inaustrial Commission, 22 Uta:, 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969), the Court stated: 
The claimant has not met the onus of 
an "accident" in tne course of his 
ment that "caused" tne "inJury" ot 
complained, which burden is his. 
at 2b') (empnasis added). 
And further: 
proving 
employ-
wnich he 
4 5 4 P. 20 
To conclude otnerwise would insure every 
truck driver, every railroad engineer, every 
airplane pilot, and a lot of otr.ers, against 
the physiological malfunction or pnysical 
collapse of any ot hundreds of human organs, 
completely unproven as to cause, but com-
pensable only by virtue of tne happenstance 
that the malfunction, collapse or inJury 
occurred while tne employee was on tne JOb, 
and not at home or elsewhere. 4'>4 P.2d at 
285. 
The above language was referred to by tnis Court as recentl, 
February, 1982 in Sabo's Electronic Service v. Sabo, Utah, " 
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The Court reatf irmed its definition and requirements 
'"'i'uisable "accident" under the terms of the Utah work-
,,'" umpensat1on Act, saying that "the mere showing of inJury 
,JuPS nut 1 pso facto mean that a compensable ace ident has 
uccurred." The Court cited such recent decisions as Church of 
or Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commission and 
1nurman, Utah, 590 P.2d 3L8 and Farmers Grain Co-op v. 
Utah, 606 P.2d 237 (1980) and stated once again that the 
applicant oears the burden of showing the causal relationship 
ot hlS duties of employment to the unexpected inJury which 
occurreo. (Saoo case, 642 P.2d at 726) 
Thus, it is apparent that this Court consistently has 
nela, as Chief Justice Hall clearly outlined in his opinion in 
Sabo, that tnere must be an ident1f iable accident and further 
that tne applicant must establish proof of the causal relation-
of the duties of the employment to the in]ury or death. 
Defendant has contended that sne need not prove a 
causal relationship between decedent's worK duties and his 
deatn at the No. 9 settling tank because this is a workmen's 
compensation case and not a civil tort action. She cites as 
autnooty Prows v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Utah, 610 
P. 2a U62 (1980), in which this Court used the following 
langtJage: 
This Court, along 
Jurisdictions, has 
with the courts 
recognizea that 
-9-
of other 
concepts 
of negligence, contributory negligence, 
fault, and similar tort conceµts nave no 
place 1>1itnin the remedial frameworK ot the 
Compensation Act. 
Defendant has erroneously includea causation as one ot 
"similar tort concepts" having no place in the determination ot 
compensabi 1 i ty in workmen's compensation cases. Such conten-
tion is 1>1holly untenable as tnis Court nas held many times. 
It has long been recognized -- and plaintiff acknowl-
edges -- tnat an employee's fault, negligence, or contributory 
negligence does not destroy the right to compensation. That is 
tne basic premise for the entire enactment of 1>1orkmen's compen-
sation legislation. Suen recognition, ho1>1ever, has never been 
held by this Court to affect the critical requirement in work-
men's compensation matters that the claimant must prove the 
causal relationship bet1>1een the inJury or deatn on the one hano 
and the duties of employment on the otner. As mentioned aoove, 
this Court in the 19tL:: Sabo decision, supra, unanimously helJ 
that the injury or death must be causally related to tne worK 
being done and that tne claimant bears tne burden of proving 
the causal relationship of the duties of employment to the 
inJ ury or deatn. (642 P.2d at 726.) It is still true as 
stated by this Court in Higley v. Industrial Commiss10n, Ji 
Utah 361, 285 P. 306 (1930): 
To sustain this burden it is not enough to 
sno1>1 a state of facts whicn is equally con-
sistent with no right of compensation as it 
-10-
is with such right. Surmise, con)ecture, 
•Juess or speculation is not sufficient to 
JllSt lty a t 1nding in the plaintiff's behalf. 
Iri this case defendant has acKnowledged that it is 
unknown why decedent was at the place where his death occurred 
and tnat it would be notning more than speculation to offer any 
spec1t1c explanation tending to show a causal relationship 
uetween his deatn and his work duties. Therefore, the ration-
ale expressea by Justice Stewart speaking for this Court in a 
unanimous decision in the recent case of Staheli v. Farmers' 
Cooperative ot Southern Utah, Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (1982) applies 
directly and equally to tnis workmen's compensation case: 
When tne proximate cause 
left to speculation, tne 
matter of law 
of an inJury is 
claim fails as a 
Plaintiff is well aware that "course of employment" 
under Utah law includes more tnan the express duties assigned 
to an employet while he is performing his assigned work on tne 
premises ot tne employer. The scope and course of one's 
employment in a given case can include not only the direct and 
primary duties of the ass1gnea )Ob but also those things which 
are reasonably necessary and incidental tnereto. See, Hafer's, 
Inc. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 526 P.2d 1188 (1974) where 
tn1s Court held that tne evidence affirmatively snowed that the 
assigned duties of the applicant traveling salesman included as 
inc thereto Keeping his car in a safe and efficient 
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running condition. An in]ury which occurred while he 
repairing tne car shock absorbers was found to be w1tt11r: 
course of his employment. The language of the Court: 
Nevertheless, the scope ot one's emµloyment 
includes not only those things wnicn are the 
direct and primary duties of the assigned 
)Ob but also those things which are reason-
ably necessary and 
(Emphasis supplied) 526 P.2d at 1189. 
However, there is a distinction between activities whicn are 
considered "incidental" to an employee's employment and triose 
whicn are not. Such a distinction was made, clearly and mean-
ingfully, by the Court in Rowley v. Industrial Commission, 15 
Utah 2d 330, 392 P.2d 1016 (1964) Tne Court held tnat a real 
estate salesman was not acting in the course of his employment 
when he left the house that he had sold and proceeded to help 
the purchaser free his automobile which was stuck in tne snow. 
This was so even though he had been within the course of his 
employment when checking the utilities in the house a few 
moments betore. 
In summary, tne requirements for a compensable inJur1 
or death under the Utah workmen's Compensation Act as enun-
ciated by this Court in the decisions mentioned aoove and 
reconfirmed recently in the Sabo case (642 P.2d 722 at 725) ano 
in Pittsourgh Testing Laboratory and Lioerty Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Keller, Utah, 657 P.2d 1367 at 1370 (1':!83) are now sn 
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1_,r 0 L1shed as to be beyond controversy. Those require-
'I :0 
l. Tne applicant 
1nJury or deatn was 
aule accident; 
must establish 
caused by an 
that the 
ident1fi-
2. Tne inJ ury or death must be causally 
related to the duties of employment; and 
3. That for purposes of compensability 
under the Act, the duties of employment 
include not only the direct and primary 
duties of the assigned job but also those 
things wnich are reasonably necessary and 
incidental thereto. 
Tne burden is upon the applicant to satisfy those 
requirements in order to establish a compensable inJury or 
deatn under the Utah worKmen's Compensation Act. As mentioned 
aoove and as will be shown in plaintiff's following argument, 
tne applicant in tnis case has failed completely to estaolish 
tne requisite causal connection between decedent's employment 
nuties, primary or incidental, and his untimely death at the 
110. 9 settling tanK located on plaintiff's premises. 
2. THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
ScPPC!k'I' A FINDING THAT DECEDENT'S DEATH AT THE NO. 9 SETTLING 
TANK WAS CnUSAI.,LY RELA1'E.D TO HIS EMPLOYMENT DUTIES. 
The duties of the decedent, Alex Georgas, as precipi-
tation plant tripper operator are set forth in Exhibit D-1 (R. 
IK91 and may be briefly summarized as follows: 
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Operates the traveling tr lp[>er 
flow of scrap iron to eacl, of 
tion or stripping cones fron, 
feeder c0nvey c' L • 
t 
th• 
t i.L' 
Observes 
mainta1r.s 
directed. 
level 
tli e 
of s c r a1' 
1eV('1 
i run in 
1 n C"a ci, 
cJ 1 l C' l t (. 
r1 r (' l l' l t ,-l_ 
r c \' +_· r JI ! l 
l'(•[i• a 11d 
Info r r.1 s c r an e operator w he 1, n e c es s a r y t r, 
increase flow of scra[J irccn frur;, a1•ror1 
feeder on the gantry. 
Activates 
conveyors. 
control t (J 
Performs minor adJustments and l ubr icat ion 
to tripper; rer:wves scrap iron frorr. tripper 
and reversible conve:,·or idlers and rollers 
when necessary to prevent damage and to 
raaintain proper operation; keeps tripper 
area clean and orderly. 
In his perforrr.ance of the work duties described above, 
decedent's work routine--as brought out clearly at the hearir. 
by his supervisors--was wholly predictable (R. 124--Davieo, 
R. 177, 178--Deneris) and consisted of the following: Deceden' 
parked in the employee parking lot directly in fror.t of cte 
precipitation plant office building (uesignated in Exr.ibit J-: 
as Area tio. 1) and proceeded directly to his locker in t:.0· 
building (Ex. D-2, where he changed clothes, put on>,. 
hard hat and other work equipnent. He next walked to the ,:re· 
cipitation plant and went up the stairs to his work station b. 
a tripper operator at the top of the precipitat1or< plan·. 
(Ex. D-2, Areas 3, 4 and S). lie workeu steadily at t:• 
push-button controls of the tripper operator cab until de,,, 
nated lunch time, then went back down the stairs to the !uric 
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t11e fJrec1p1tation plant office building for lunch (Area 
refJortea at the hearing tnat decedent always placed 
, 'C ,c 1 1-'""" call to his wife and; or daughter at their home in 
, 01 1 C:1ty during the luncneon break, after which he 
his lunch ana then proceeded directly back to his 
"'r'. station tor the remainder ot his work shift. Upon comple-
cion of the worK shift, decedent returned to the cnange room 
,Area 21 "1t1ere he changed clotnes tnen walked to nis car at the 
parnn'3 lot (Area l) and drove to his home in Salt Lake City. 
it is significant to note tnat none of the daily work 
art1v1ties nor the "going to and from" activities of decedent 
callea for or even reasonaoly explainea his presence at tne No. 
9 settling tank where he was found on November 16, 1981. (Ex. 
Area 9) 
while there is considerable evidence in the record as 
ro decedent's severely diseased heart condition and speculation 
as to its possiole contribution to his death, tnere is no evi-
oence in the record tending to snow any relationship between 
that a i seased heart condition and deceased' s employment duties, 
e[lrnary or incidental. Foreman Davies testified that there was 
only minimal pnysical exertion on the tripper operator JOb 
'H. 1311. There was no claim or even suggestion of any causal 
relationship between decedent's ]Ob duties and his heart 
and the Administrative Law Judge found that his heart 
-ls-
problems were nonindustrial in nature. Thus, in tr11s ca:)( 
do not have a JOO exertion caused heart attacK such ac, tr", 
referred to by this Court in the recent case ot 
Steel Corp. v. Draper, Utah 61J P. 2d ( 1 <JbO) 
exertion in running to the possiole assistance of a fell 0 , 
employee was found to be "reasonaoly expected" of and tnus 
"incidental" to the employment duties. 
It is equally clear tnat decedent's death at tne No. 9 
settling tank likewise had no causal relationship to his 
employment duties, primary or incidental, as a tripper operator 
at plaintiff's precipitation plant. The evidence shows 
(R. 132) that decedent's body was found in tne No. 9 settling 
tank which is designatea as Area No. 9 in Exhibit D-2. Tr.e 
No. 9 settling tank is inaccessiole by any direct route froo, 
decedent's precipitation plant tripper operator worK station 
(R. 126, 127; see also, Exhibit D-3, R. 186). Tne two loca-
tions are separated by a 10 foot cement wall, several railroaG 
tracks ana a ditch and steep embankment (R. 127 and 128). Tne 
No. 9 tank is also far removed from ana is not pas sea, 
traversea or connected with decedent's travel route to or froo, 
the parking lot (Area 1, Exhibit D-2), to or from his cnange 
room or lunchroom (Area 2, Exnioit D-2) or to or from his arra 
of work activities (Areas 3, 4 and 5, Exhibit D-2). As state; 
above, the evidence is undisputed also tnat none of decedent's 
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t npper operator required or involved in any way his 
e at tne No. ':J settl1ny tank where he was found. (See 
13 ,1 and also R. 110, 112). 
There was no eviaence ottered to show a reasonably 
rossible "incidental" work relationship between the decedent's 
,criv1t1es at tne No. 9 settling tank and his precipitation 
plant tripper operator JOb duties. Under sucn circumstances it 
coJld hardly be sa1a that decedent's presence at tne No. 9 
settling tanK would be one of "those things which it should 
reasonauly be expected an employee would do in connection with 
those [work] duties" as found by the Commission and by this 
Cocnt in tne Draper case. (613 P.2d 508, 509) 
In this case no reasonable expectation or explanation 
of any kind nas been aavanced to account for decedent's 
presence at the No. 9 settling tanK. This was acknowledged by 
:ocnsel for defenaant (R. 212): 
it is nothing more than speculation to 
say that the decedent went to tne old opera-
tion center to get a drink, in any event, 
that would not explain wny he went to the 
No. ':! pond. 
In view ot tne above, it was reversible error for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge to combine such acknowledged conjectures and 
'peculations witn an equally serious and wholly unsupportable 
"'IS>tatement of tact and declare that decedent was "in the 
'":rse ot his employment" at the No. ':J settling tank where his 
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} ;I 
settling tank where 1,e fuunci. i. 
Administrative Law· Judge aur.i1ttt:u, it .... t __.r 1 \_IJf1Jt 
conclude that decedent left tt1e (Jff1,--_-'"=' .3r1J ruo:--
and went to the old OiJerat10ns centc:r I' ,)- .__, -J CJ '· [ 
purpose of getting a drink uecause tLe dr1ni.ir1 'v.'a ·.,.·a. e,:: 
at the change roor;i building. [ v e: n o s s L :., i n (:l , 
v a 1 id i t y o f s u ch a c on j e ct u r e , n o e x p 1 a n a t i u n w I 1 a t e v e r L 21 ,,, ,, . , 
offered to account for decedent's presence at tt.c: :;c. 
settling tank where his death occurred. 
';'he Administrative Lav.· Judge foJnd that the c'. 
available drinking ... ater "as "adjacent to" the s 1 te "'·"'' 
decedent was found. ( R. 2 3 5) Su er, 
inaccurate and completely unsupported 
finding 
by the recorJ. ':':.c 
record is clear and uncontroverted that the llo. 9 settling •.ar,: 
is 200 yards away fror;i the old operations center and 1n tr.:. 
opposite travel direction to decedent's work stat1rr. 
( R. 12 6) . Moreover, it is clear fror;i tr,e record (Ex. ::i-4, 
and R . 12 9 ) that the 2 0 0 ya r cl "a 1 kw a y fro r. t !1 e o 1 d or er at ; 
plant (Ex. D-2, Area 8) to the no. 9 settling tanl; •:.er:. 
decedent's death occurred (D-2, Area 9) is not only narro• L·"· 
contains nur;ierous hazards and obstructions. 
stated by claimant's Memorandum in of f. • 
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eve" assuminy a possible work.related reason (obtain-
,,,,inc; water l for decedent's presence at the old opera-
tions r:-111 ldi ng, there is no reasonable explanation whatever for 
nis presence LUO yards away at the No. 9 settling tank wnere 
n's death occur red. The claimant (defendant herein) has failed 
com,_,letely her ouraen to estaolish that decedent's death at tne 
9 settling tank was causally related to his work duties. 
It is not enougn for defendant or tne Administrative 
,,a• Judge to say that decedent would not have died by drowning 
"cut for" his employment with plaintiff. Nor is it sufficient 
to say that since decedent was not forbidden to go to tne No 9 
settling tank tnat he tnen must still be considered in the 
course of nis employment even though no explanation--work 
related or otnerw1se--has been offered to account for his 
?resence at that site. This Court many times has hela that it 
cs tne claimant's buraen to establish the causal nexus between 
ris tn]ury or death on the one hand and his work duties on the 
•tr.er. No eviaence tending to show such causal nexus was 
presented in this case. In fact, Kennecott has affirmatively 
rrcijoceo evidence which shows clearly that there was no causal 
re1.,t1onst-.ip wnatever between decedent's activities or presence 
tr" No settling tank and his work duties, primary or 
··jp,,t:_a_J, for his employer. 
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It is clear from the above that tr11s is not d r,, 
like Draper where claimant's affirmative ev1uence prov1oecJ , 
reasonable explanation for tne activities wn1ch were fauna tc. 
be reasonably "incidental" to tne decedent's employment; nor is 
it like Hafer' s, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 526 P.ic 
1188 (1974) wnere affirmative evidence snowed tnat tne ass1gneo 
duties of the applicant traveling salesman included as inc 1-
dental thereto keeping his car in a safe and efficient runnin, 
condition. As noted before, the Court stated: 
Nevertheless, the scope of one's employment 
includes not only those things which are tne 
oirect and primary duties of the assigned 
Job but also those tnings which are reason-
aoly necessary and incidental 
P.2d at 1189. (Emphasis supplied) 
Tnis language has been cited many times by tnis Court and sets 
forth current Utan law as interpreteo by this Court for aeter-
mining wnether or not the requisite causal relationsnip exists 
in any given case between the in]ury or death on the one hand 
ano the employment duties, primary or incidental, on tne 
other. It covers both the Draper and Hafer' s cases where the 
acts involved were found to be reasonably related to the duties 
which the employee was hired or authorized to perform. It 
covers the Rowley case, supra, where the act1vit1es were founo 
not to be reasonably related to the employment duties ot t1,e 
real estate salesman involved. Indeed, it covers also 
Industrial Commission, 106 Utan 489, 150 P. 2d J79 (1944) c1tea 
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"1,rnL and the Administrative Law Judge. In Tavey, 
,pP t111s case, applicant's inJury occurred while she was 
perlorm1ng the very duties she was hired and assigned to per-
toriTI. Finally, it covers this Court's Maren 18, 19!!3 Decision 
10 .1 w Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission and Tilt, Case 
No. l!Jl3U. It was held tnat decedent's activities on the 
employer's premises were not those things an employee reason-
,JDly could be expected to do in connection with work duties 
and, therefore, tne Industrial Commission Award was an unrea-
sona::;le and improper expansion by the Commission of the scope 
and/ or course of employment duties under tne Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
It is plaintiff's position that the same law, the same 
standards and the same criteria apply to decedent's deatn in 
1n1s case. It was defendant's buraen to establish the 
requisite causal relationship between decedent's death at the 
:,o. 9 settling tanK and nis employment duties, primary or 
incidental, with plaintiff. There is no evidence in the record 
tu support such a finding. The evidence was uncontroverted and 
indeed acknowledged that decedent's actual work duties did not 
requHe, nor were they in any way connected with, his presence 
the No. 9 settling tank which was far removed from and 
li"ir _c, o;1ule to nis precipitation plant area of operation. It 
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was uncontroverted and acknowleagea also that the site ut 
dent's death was not passed or traversed by decedent ut 
reasonaDly accessible to him in going to or f ram his par'· i, 
lot, to or from his change room or lunchroom, to or fron, '" 
area of work activities or even to or from a source ot a'JaJJ-
able drinking water. Finally, there was no eviaence presented 
or referred to which provides a reasonaDle workrelated explana-
tion tor decedent's presence at the No. 9 settling 
Def end ant has failed completely to establish the causa1 
relationship required by tne Act between decedent's deatn ana 
his duties of employment. 
Plaintiff is well aware of tne rule of construction 
stated by Justice Howe in the J & w Janitorial Co. case: 
We acknowledge tne recognized rule of con-
struction which resolves any doubt regarding 
compensation in favor of recovery. McPhie 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 567 P.2d 153 
(1977). And, we are mindful of the defer-
ence this Court gives the Industrial Commis-
sion's decisions on review. Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Montredi, Utah, 631 P.2d 888 
(1981). Nonetheless, the only reasonable 
conclusion from the evidence here was that 
Jeffrey was not Killed in an accident which 
arose "out of or in the course of employ-
ment." (Green sheet, Case No. 18130) 
So it is in this case. The Administrative Law Judge found that 
decedent had an "idiopathic fall" at the No. 9 settling tanK. 
There is no substantial evidence--not even a medical opinion-
that he "probably" had such an idiopathic fall. The fincJ1, 
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, wcts predicated on speculation. From the evidence in 
, J, it could have been conJectured also that decedent 
.pi.nd er stumbled, that Lt: was pushed or, indeed, that r.<= 
1urr.r·•"d into the No. 9 settling tank. 
Fror:i the critical standpoint of causal relationship, 
[,.Jwever, the sarc.e causal requirei.1ents apf'lY to U.e acc1-
der.tal fall1ng by or deliberate pusr.ing of decedent as 
a"?li' to the •idiopathic fall' doctrine applied by the hdminis-
crat1ve ;..a1o. Judge. That basic requirement--which is completel;· 
riss1 ng in this case--is the causal nexus between decedent's 
eresence at the No. 9 settling tank and his employment duties, 
eitr.er pr irc,ary or incidental. As indicated before it has been 
acKnowledged that decedent's work duties had no conceivable 
relationship to his presence at the tlo. 9 settling tank. Nor 
is there any evidence that he was engaged at that location in 
·:r.ose things which it should reasonably be expected an 
wodd 
S:ates Steel 
do in 
Corp. 
connection 
v. Draper, 
with [work] 
quoted by 
reversing the Industrial Commission Order 
Janitorial Co. case. 
Claimant has failed to establish 
duties.• 
Justice 
in the 
United 
Howe in 
J 
that decedent's 
'idiopathic fall' or his accident at the No. 9 settling tank 
a fall or an accident in the course of his employment. The 
'"lY reasonable conclusion from the evidence in the record is 
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that decedent was not killed in an accident which aruse 
or in the course of his employment." 
3. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIOIJ ABUSED ITS DISCRE: 
IN ADOPTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE Is FINDING 
DECEDENT WAS "IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT" AT THC !iC. 
SETTLING TANK WHERE HIS DEATH OCCURRED. 
The Administrative Law Judge's finding (adopted by._ 
Cor.unission) that decedent could have gone to the old operatic· 
center (Ex. D-2, Area 8) for a drink of water was nothing t. 
conjecture based on the testimony that there was drinking we'., 
available at Area 8 while there was no drinking water availat. 
in the change room (Area 2) where decedent last was seen. 
finding that decedent had an "idiopathic fall" at the No, 
settling tank likewise is sheer speculation. There is no e·.·:-
dence in the record to support such conjecture. It co •. 
equally be said that decedent fell or that he stumbled into t· 
No. 9 settling tank, hit his head on the wall and us 
.drowned. However, the glaring misstatement 
portable finding by the Administrative Law 
and wholly unsc;· 
Judge is that 
decedent was in the course of his employment because the sit 
of his death (Ex. D-2, Area 9) was "adjacent to• the availabi 
drinking water in the old operations building (Area 81 
stated above, there is no evidence to support 
In fact, the clear evidence in the record (R. 
-24-
such a f ind1 1 : 
186, Ex. D-4 '· 
11,, record testimony (R. 126) completely contradict such 
1 1 ,,,1 "''l. No evidence was produced by claimant or referred to 
u/ the Administrative Law Judge or the Commission to explain 
rlecedent 's presence at the No. 9 settling tank or to causally 
cunnect it with his employment duties, primary or incidental. 
In summary, the finding that decedent was in the course of his 
enployment at the site of his death was erroneous, wholly 
unsupported by any evidence in the record ancl, therefore, an 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSIOtl 
This case calls for direct application of two well-
established principles of workmen's compensation law as inter-
preted and consistently followed by this Court: 
1. Claimant (defendant herein) must establish a 
causal relationship between the injury or death by accident on 
tne one hand and the employment duties, primary or incidental, 
on the other. 
2. Employment duties for purposes of determining 
such causal relationship include not only the primary or 
d11U,orized and assigned work duties but also those duties and 
activities which are reasonably necessary and incidental 
Defendants have acknowledged that the employment 
duties of the decedent Alex Georgas neither required nor 
111·111lved in any way his presence or activity at the No. 9 
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settling tan<. L l k "=" v.· is e de t end ant '., t 1 u ._, c t d 1 l i 1 
decedent's presence or act1v1t1e:; at :lr1. \) ',(·· 
location were necessary or inc1dentdl 1n any 
any of n1s employment duties or act1vitie'.O, pr1m'"r i 'Jt 
dental. Finally, there is no shuwiny that deceased •,.,·as at 
location engaged in "tnose tnings wnich it shoulcJ reasonac. 
expected an employee would do in connection w i U1 
duties." 'l'ne record evidence fails completely to estalH!s;. 
requisite reasonable causal relationship between aeceaer.• 
death ana nis work duties. The only reasonable conclusDr. ': 
the evidence is that decedent was not killed in an accice 
wr1icn arose "out of or in tne course of employment" with·,, 
contemplation of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act as ir··· 
preted by tnis Court. Tnerefore, tne Order awardincJ uene' 
should be set aside in its entirety. 
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